Archive for: December 2008

Metaphor and the Space Structuring Model

Seana Coulson

University of California, San Diego

Teenie Matlock

University of California, Santa Cruz

ABSTRACT

We propose an account of metaphor comprehension based on conceptual blending theory. We review data from on-line processing measures that support predictions of conceptual blending theory, and report results of an off-line feature listing study that assessed how different sorts of contexts alter the information activated by a given word. Participants generated features for words used in the null context, in sentences that promoted a literal reading of the target word, sentences that promoted a metaphorical reading, and sentences that required literal mapping. In literal mapping, the literal sense of the word was used in a way that prompts the reader to blend it with structure from a different domain. Results revealed some overlap in the features generated in each of the four contexts, but that some proportion of the features listed for words in literal, literal mapping, and metaphoric sentence contexts were unique and context-specific.

Metaphor and the Space Structuring Model

Moral Politics:How Liberals and Conservatives Think

An excerpt from

Moral Politics

How Liberals and Conservatives Think

George Lakoff

Chapter Two

The Worldview Problem for American Politics

Puzzles for Liberals

Conservatives are fond of suggesting that liberals don’t understand what they say, that they just don’t get it. The conservatives are right. The ascendancy of conservative ideology in recent years and, in particular, the startling conservative victory in the 1994 congressional elections have left liberals mystified about a great many things. Here are some examples.

The best collections about CL and second language acquisition are the Achard & Niemeier (2004) edited volume, Cognitive Linguistics, Second Language Acquisition & Foreign Language Teaching and the Putz, Dirven & Niemeier (2001) two volume set Applied Cognitive Linguistics. Vol.1 deals with theory & acquisition. Vol.2 with language pedagogy.

Recent milestones in the lexicon-encyclopedia debate

Peeters, Bert (2000). “Setting the scene. Recent milestones in the lexicon-encyclopedia debate”.

The lexicon – encyclopedia interface

(Current research in the semantics / pragmatics interface, 5; Bert Peeters, ed.). Oxford: Elsevier Science. 1-52.

Setting the scene:

Some recent milestones in the

lexicon-encyclopedia debate[1]

Bert Peeters

University of Tasmania, School of English and European Languages and

Literatures, GPO Box 252-82, Hobart TAS 7001, Australia

E-mail: Bert.Peeters@utas.edu.au

0. Introduction

Questions about the exact nature of linguistic as opposed to non-linguistic knowledge have been asked for as long as humans have studied language, be it as linguists, philosophers, psychologists, language teachers, semioticians, cognitive scientists, whatever. The distinction has been maintained and defended by some, attacked and abandoned by others. Those who have maintained and defended the distinction have drawn the line in many different ways. Very solid arguments have been advanced in both camps; in the course of a) editing this volume, and b) doing the research leading up to the present paper, I have seen so many that in the end, no longer sure of my own thoughts on the matter, I had to reluctantly decide to cancel my own contribution, or at least to hold it over until I would have had enough time for further reflexion.

Surface Generalizations: an alternative to alternations

2002. Cognitive Linguistics.

Surface Generalizations: an alternative to alternations[1]

Adele E. Goldberg

University of Illinois

Abstract

Since the earliest days of generative grammar, there has existed a strong tendency to consider one argument structure construction in relation to a particular rough paraphrase. Initially this was a result of the emphasis on transformations that derived one pattern from another. While today there exist many non-derivational theories for which this motivation no longer exists, the traditional outlook has not completely lost its grip, as can be seen from continuing focus on partial or incomplete generalizations such as the “dative” construction or the “locative” alternation. This paper argues that it is profitable to look beyond alternations and to consider each surface pattern on its own terms. Differences among instances of the same surface pattern are often most naturally attributed directly to the different verbs and arguments involved.

Embodiment and Cognitive Science

Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr

Introduction

Embodiment in the field of cognitive science refers to understanding the role of an agent’s own body in its everyday, situated cognition. For example, how do our bodies influence the ways we think and speak? Consider the following narrative written by a 23-year-old woman, Sandra, who was asked to describe a recent, important life event. Sandra began her narrative by noting that she was engaged to be married to an older man who worked in the computer industry in northern California. Quite recently, Sandra’s fiancé asked her to sign a prenuptial agreement and this request evoked many feelings that Sandra struggled to deal with.

UNDERSTANDING FIGURATIVE AND LITERAL LANGUAGE: THE GRADED SALIENCE HYPOTHESIS

Rachel Giora

Linguistics

Tel Aviv University

Tel Aviv 69978

Israel

ABSTRACT

In this study I test the prevalent claims among contemporary psycholinguists that understanding metaphor does not involve a special process, and that it is essentially identical to understanding literal language. Particularly, I examine the claims that figurative language does not involve processing the surface literal meaning (e.g., Gibbs, 1984), and that its comprehension is not processing-intensive, because it does not involve a trigger (e.g., Keysar, 1989). A critique, review and reinterpretation of a number of contemporary researches on literal and figurative language reveal that figurative and literal language use are governed by a general principle of salience: Salient meanings (e.g., conventional, frequent, familiar, enhanced by prior context) are processed first. Thus, for example, when the most salient meaning is intended (as in e.g., the figurative meaning of conventional idioms), it is accessed directly, without having to process the less salient (literal) meaning first (Gibbs, 1980).

High-level metonymy and linguistic structure[1]

Francisco Jos?Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez

Olga Isabel Díez Velasco

University of La Rioja

0. Introduction

Ever since George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980) published their seminal work Metaphors We Live By, many cognitive linguists have devoted much of their research to exploring metaphorical systems in different languages. Metonymy, however, has received comparatively little attention. During the eighties and the nineties work on metonymy has mainly focused on setting up definitional and typological criteria (Croft, 1993; Dirven, 1993; Langacker, 1993; Kövecses and Radden, 1998, 1999), studying the metonymic grounding of metaphor (Barcelona, 2000; Radden, 2000), its role in conceptual interaction (Goossens, 1995; Ruiz de Mendoza, 1997a; Díez, 2000; Turner and Fauconnier, 2000) and in inferencing (Gibbs, 1994; Thornburg and Panther, 1997; Panther and Thornburg, 1998, 1999; Ruiz de Mendoza, 1999a; Pérez and Ruiz de Mendoza, 2001). Most of this research, however, has been concerned with the

【摘要】俚语是一种特殊的语言形式，是美国语言不可缺少的重要组成部分，它反映了文化影响语言的内在作用，还具有其他词汇层所无或不全具备的独特风格，是一种极富文化涵义的词汇，是美国文化的特殊载体。文章通过探讨美国俚语的构成形式、语意功能以及社会文化理据三个方面来进一步分析美国俚语的文化特征。

【关键词】美国俚语;语言特征;文化特征

NEURAL SUBSTRATES OF METAPHOR

Rachel Giora and Argyris K. Stringaris

The interest in how the brain processes METAPHORS traces its origins back to a tradition which regarded figurative language as POETIC and hence the opposite of literal language. Despite its ubiquity (Lakoff and Johnson 1980), the underlying assumption has been that this difference should be reflected both in behavioral (Grice 1975; Searle 1979) and brain mechanisms. In this chapter we examine this and other long-standing assumptions, suggesting that the interactions of linguistics with empirical, neuropsychological, and neuroscientific research have drawn a far more complex and, arguably, fascinating picture, not only about metaphor but also about the brain.

Is Metaphor Really So Different?