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UNDERSTANDING FIGURATIVE AND LITERAL LANGUAGE: THE GRADED SALIENCE HYPOTHESIS

Rachel Giora

Linguistics

Tel Aviv University

Tel Aviv 69978

Israel

ABSTRACT

In this study I test the prevalent claims among contemporary psycholinguists that understanding metaphor does not involve a special process, and that it is essentially identical to understanding literal language. Particularly, I examine the claims that figurative language does not involve processing the surface literal meaning (e.g., Gibbs, 1984), and that its comprehension is not processing-intensive, because it does not involve a trigger (e.g., Keysar, 1989). A critique, review and reinterpretation of a number of contemporary researches on literal and figurative language reveal that figurative and literal language use are governed by a general principle of salience: Salient meanings (e.g., conventional, frequent, familiar, enhanced by prior context) are processed first. Thus, for example, when the most salient meaning is intended (as in e.g., the figurative meaning of conventional idioms), it is accessed directly, without having to process the less salient (literal) meaning first (Gibbs, 1980).

NEURAL SUBSTRATES OF METAPHOR

Rachel Giora and Argyris K. Stringaris

The interest in how the brain processes METAPHORS traces its origins back to a tradition which regarded figurative language as POETIC and hence the opposite of literal language. Despite its ubiquity (Lakoff and Johnson 1980), the underlying assumption has been that this difference should be reflected both in behavioral (Grice 1975; Searle 1979) and brain mechanisms. In this chapter we examine this and other long-standing assumptions, suggesting that the interactions of linguistics with empirical, neuropsychological, and neuroscientific research have drawn a far more complex and, arguably, fascinating picture, not only about metaphor but also about the brain.

Is Metaphor Really So Different?